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ABSTRACT. Tropical forests in developing countries are increasingly being valued for their role in carbon sequestration. Such interest
is reflected in the emergence of international initiatives for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+).
REDD+ requires addressing both tropical forests as complex social-ecological systems and the multiple sectors involved in tropical
forest resources, which may necessitate transformational change away from business-as-usual approaches to forest governance. We
studied the potential for REDD+ to mobilize an influential coalition of actors promoting transformational change in forest governance
in Papua New Guinea (PNG), a leading proponent of REDD+ internationally. Combining policy network approaches with the advocacy
coalition framework, we identified four advocacy coalitions in the REDD+ policy domain in PNG and estimated the influence of each
coalition. We found the most influential advocacy coalition is promoting the status quo rather than governance reforms capable of
reducing deforestations and forest degradation, leading us to suggest that business as usual is the dominant perspective in the REDD+
policy domain in PNG. This may explain why, despite the large amount of REDD+ rhetoric, there has been only modest change in
formal policy or practice in PNG to date. However, we did find influential coalitions calling for transformational change. Although
these are currently minority coalitions, we identified several pathways through which they could increase their power to realize
transformational change
Key Words: advocacy coalition framework; advocacy coalitions; forest governance; Papua New Guinea; REDD+; transformational change
INTRODUCTION
The role of tropical forests in global climate change mitigation
has received increasing international attention over the past
decade (Fearnside 2000, Soares-Filho et al. 2010, Fearnside 2012).
Proposals to reduce carbon emissions from deforestation and
forest degradation and enhance forest carbon stocks (REDD+)
have gained momentum in international climate change
negotiations (Angelsen et al. 2009), and many developing
countries are currently in the process of formulating national
REDD+ policies and strategies (see, e.g., UN-REDD Programme
2009). Given that tropical forests in developing countries are
complex social-ecological systems (Ostrom and Nagendra 2006,
Gardner et al. 2013) embedded in multilevel social, ecological,
and often highly political processes (Schmink and Wood 1992,
Young et al. 2006, Korhonen-Kurki et al. 2012), it has been
suggested that REDD+ will require transformational change in
and beyond the forest sector that challenges business-as-usual
approaches to the use and management of tropical forests
(Brockhaus and Angelsen 2012).  
Policy network theories suggest that, although politicians and
state actors have final decision-making power, policy emerges
from a network of interdependent state and nonstate actors
(Laumann and Knoke 1987, Marsh and Rhodes 1992, Knoke et
al. 1996). Within a particular policy domain, organizations must
bargain with one another to secure policy outcomes (Marsh and
Rhodes 1992) and may form advocacy coalitions based on shared
beliefs to influence government policy and achieve common
objectives (Weible 2005, Weible and Sabatier 2005, Ingold 2011). 
In this article, we use policy network approaches to analyze the
potential for REDD+ to mobilize influential coalitions of actors
promoting transformational change within national forest policy
domains. Following Brockhaus and Angelsen (2012:17), we
defined transformational change as “a shift in discourse, attitudes,
power relations, and deliberative policy and protest action that
leads policy formulation and implementation away from business
as usual policy approaches that directly or indirectly support
deforestation and forest degradation.”  
In particular, we applied the Advocacy Coalition Framework
(ACF; Sabatier and Weible 2007) to identify the presence and
influence of coalitions of actors advocating for transformational
change in forestry policy in Papua New Guinea (PNG). Using a
mixed-methods approach that combines quantitative survey data
with qualitative data from semistructured interviews and
document reviews, we asked the following research questions: (1)
Is there evidence of advocacy coalitions promoting
transformational change in the REDD+ policy domain in PNG?
(2) How influential are coalitions for transformational change?
Forests and governance in PNG
PNG’s forests are globally significant. The island of New Guinea
hosts the third largest tropical forest in the world (Shearman et
al. 2008). PNG occupies the eastern half  of New Guinea and,
despite covering less than 1% of the world’s land mass, the country
supports more than 5% of the world’s biodiversity, including
many endemic species (Government of Papua New Guinea 2007,
World Wildlife Fund,  wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/where_we_work/
new_guinea_forests/). However, PNG’s forests are facing drivers
of deforestation and forest degradation ranging from commercial
logging to conversion to smallholder and large-scale agriculture.
From 1972 to 2002, the estimated annual rate of deforestation
and forest degradation in PNG was 1.41% (Shearman et al. 2009).  
The forestry sector in PNG is characterized by illegal and
unsustainable commercial logging (Bun et al. 2004, Shearman et
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al. 2009, Fox et al. 2010), illegal forest clearance under the guise
of agricultural development (Filer 2011, 2012), and corruption
(Transparency International 2009, 2011, Laurance et al. 2011).
These features are often associated with a lack of state autonomy
from what can be considered as powerful vested interests driving
deforestation and forest degradation, particularly foreign-owned
logging companies (Laurance 2010, Melick 2010, Laurance et al.
2011). 
These features of forest governance in PNG are a reflection of
broader governance conditions within the country. In 2013, PNG
ranked 144 out of 177 countries in Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International 2013)
and is categorized as a “flawed democracy” (Kekic 2007). A major
challenge for good governance in PNG has been reconciling the
myriad traditional local political systems based on custom and
culture with the Westminster-style system of government that was
inherited at independence in 1975 (Allen and Hasnain 2010, Gelu
2010). Since independence, no single political party has ever
received enough votes at a national election to govern in its own
right, leading to the formation of large and unruly coalitions
based less on shared ideology and more on gaining or maintaining
power (Gelu 2010). Patronage politics together with ethno-
linguistic fragmentation are suggested as underlying reasons why
PNG has failed to transform its vast natural resource wealth into
broad-based improvements in social indicators (Allen and
Hasnain 2010). 
Local communities are key stakeholders in forest governance in
PNG. Around 97% of the total land area and virtually all forests
are owned by kinship groups and managed according to local
custom (National Research Institute 2007, Overseas Development
Institute 2007). In practice, however, many customary landowners
are not aware of their rights and therefore are vulnerable to
exploitation. The benefits from logging are often concentrated in
the hands of political elites at the local and national level, who
are accused of colluding with foreign logging companies and
using their positions for personal gain rather than acting in the
local interest (Filer and Sekran 1998, Overseas Development
Institute 2007, Laurance 2010).  
In this context of strong de jure but weak de facto customary land
rights, a lack of government autonomy from powerful vested
interests, and formidable drivers of deforestation, there is a real
need for governance reforms if  REDD+ is to be effective and
reduce forest carbon emissions in PNG. Governance reforms may
include more transparent and participatory policy processes,
functioning multistakeholder governance arrangements, attention
to equity including procedural equity, e.g., the free, prior, and
informed consent of customary landowners, and distributive
equity, e.g., equitable benefit-sharing arrangements (Di Gregorio
et al. 2013), and a review of existing or planned policies that enable
deforestation. If  well designed and properly implemented, such
measures could facilitate the transformational change needed to
reduce deforestation and forest degradation in PNG (Melick
2010).
Evolution of REDD+ in PNG
The governments of PNG and Costa Rica proposed the concept
of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation (then known as RED)
at the 11th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2005.
In their submission, they acknowledged the contribution of
tropical deforestation in developing countries to global carbon
emissions, but suggested that: 
 In the absence of revenue streams from standing forests,
communities and governments in many developing
countries have little incentive to prevent deforestation...
without a more complete market valuation, standing
forests cannot overcome the economic opportunity cost
associated with their conservation. (Governments of
Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica 2005)  
The government of PNG has continued to be a leading
international proponent of REDD+ (Somare 2005, 2010).
However, efforts aimed at achieving “REDD+ readiness” in PNG
have encountered numerous challenges. Work on a national
REDD+ strategy and associated institutional arrangements in
2008-2009 was marred by questions about the legal status of the
newly established Office of Climate Change and its legitimacy to
centrally manage REDD+, concerns about poor stakeholder
engagement and national ownership of REDD+ policy processes,
and media reports that “carbon cowboys” were exploiting the
policy vacuum to preemptively secure forest carbon rights from
customary landowners (Melick 2010, Babon et al. 2012; P.
Chatterton, Review of the UN-REDD joint program in Papua
New Guinea, unpublished manuscript). 
National REDD+ policy development during this period was
driven by two high-profile policy entrepreneurs (Mintrom and
Vergari 1996): Sir Michael Somare, Prime Minister of PNG from
2002 to 2011, and Kevin Conrad, head of the Coalition for
Rainforest Nations and PNG’s UN Special Envoy and
Ambassador for Climate Change. These two individuals worked
to sell the idea of REDD+ nationally and internationally and
exerted a “policy monopoly” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) at
the national level by authoritatively defining deforestation and
forest degradation as a result of market failures, thus effectively
restricting policy responses to finding ways to “value forests more
alive than dead” (Somare 2010:1). 
Somare and Conrad’s monopoly over the REDD+ agenda in
PNG, their engagement of international consulting firm
McKinsey & Company to draft PNG’s national climate-
compatible development strategy, and a lack of community
consultation triggered calls from nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) and academics for greater transparency and
participation in REDD+ policy processes, and for the inclusion
of social and environmental safeguards, particularly to protect
the rights of customary landowners (Bingeding 2009, Eco-
Forestry Forum 2010, Greenpeace 2010).  
In response to these calls, a multistakeholder governance structure
was established in March 2010 to coordinate action on climate
change (Babon and Gowae 2013). A whole-of-government
National Climate Change Committee was established as the main
decision-making body for climate change policy, with a
restructured Office of Climate Change and Development
(OCCD) to act as the main coordinating body for climate change
issues (Office of Climate Change and Development 2011). At the
same time, a multistakeholder technical working group on
REDD+ was convened with membership from government
agencies, NGOs, donors, and industry associations. The Papua
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New Guinea Forest Authority, the main state actor responsible
for forest management, would oversee a number of pilot projects
throughout the country to try various REDD+ strategies,
including reduced-impact logging, secondary forest management,
and forest conservation. Five province-level pilot projects have
been officially endorsed by the government of PNG, although
most are still in the readiness phase (Office of Climate Change
and Development 2012). 
A period of political turmoil in PNG beginning in late 2011 and
culminating in a national election in June 2012 saw both Somare
and Conrad leaving office. A new Ministry of Forests and Climate
Change was created, to which the OCCD now reports rather than
to the Prime Minister. The full implications of this change are yet
to be seen, but it is worth noting that other countries such as
Indonesia (Indrarto et al. 2012) have tended to separate
responsibility for climate change policy and responsibility for
forest policy. This separation of powers may alleviate possible
conflicts of interest and path dependencies that favor forest
exploitation and existing forest industries over forest
conservation. Given the turbulent evolution of REDD+ in PNG,
the departure of prominent REDD+ policy entrepreneurs, and
an almost complete reconfiguration of individual actors in the
REDD+ policy domain following the ousting of Somare,
questions remain regarding the existence and influence of
coalitions for transformational change that could induce
improved forest governance and result in REDD+ outcomes.
Theoretical framework
We drew on the ACF developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith
(1993) to investigate the presence and influence of coalitions of
actors advocating for transformational change in forest policy in
PNG. The ACF was developed as a systems-based model of policy
change within policy domains characterized by technical
complexity or uncertainty, multiple actors, and competing belief
systems (Sabatier and Weible 2007). As described by Ingold and
Varone (2012:321), the ACF “views the policy process as a
competition between coalitions of actors who advocate beliefs
about policy problems and solutions.” The value of the ACF in
our study lay in its ability to explain the dynamic nature and
uneven power relations characteristic of the governance of social-
ecological systems in developing countries. In particular, we found
that the ACF provided a useful model for explaining the
formulation of policy coalitions (Bulkeley 2000, Weible 2005) and
exploring the role of policy entrepreneurs (Mintrom and Vergari
1996) and policy learning (Weible 2006) in driving policy change.  
The ACF posits that actors in a given policy domain form
advocacy coalitions to influence government policy and achieve
common objectives (Weible 2005, Weible and Sabatier 2005,
Ingold 2011). Advocacy coalitions are composed of actors who
“share a set of normative and causal beliefs” and are engaged in
“a non-trivial degree of co-ordinated activity over time” (Sabatier
1998:103). Although members of an advocacy coalition may
disagree on secondary beliefs such as the details of a particular
policy, they will agree on fundamental aspects, termed “policy
core beliefs” (Sabatier 1998:103). The relative importance given
to economic development versus environmental protection is one
example of a policy core belief  (Sabatier 1998). Most policy
domains have a dominant advocacy coalition, which is relatively
successful in translating its goals and beliefs into policy, and one
or more minority advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith 1993).  
The ACF predicts that major policy change will occur only if
there is a change in the beliefs of the dominant coalition or
changes in available resources. Coalition resources include access
to legal authority to make policy decisions, information,
supporters, financial resources, and skillful leadership (Weible
2006). Changes in policy beliefs and resources can be brought
about in four ways: external shocks, policy-oriented learning,
internal events, or negotiated agreements (Weible et al. 2009). We
used the ACF to assess the extent to which the emergence of
REDD+ at the international level, an external event as defined
by the ACF, has provided a catalyst for transformational change
in PNG, and whether the internal dynamics of the national
REDD+ policy domain are likely to constrain or enable such
change. 
Our focus was on identifying advocacy coalitions based on shared
policy core beliefs, particularly the creation of transparent,
accountable, multiactor governance arrangements for REDD+.
Although governance is just one aspect of transformational
change, we selected this focus because of PNG’s history of poor
forest governance and its documented relationship to the drivers
of deforestation and forest degradation (Papua New Guinea
Commission of Inquiry into Aspects of the Forest Industry et al.
1990, Forest Trends 2006, International Tropical Timber Council
2007, Overseas Development Institute 2007). 
Because this study sought to identify and analyze the role of
advocacy coalitions in REDD+ policy networks and policy
change, we used perceived influence as a measure of reputational
power (Kriesi et al. 2006) and an indication of a coalition’s power
to translate its beliefs into formal policy. This approach has been
effectively applied by several authors (Zafonte and Sabatier 1998,
Weible 2005, 2006, Weible and Sabatier 2005). We used this
measure because it allowed us to assess the potential for a coalition
calling for transformational change to become dominant in PNG.  
This study adds to nascent applications of the ACF in developing
countries and is notable for its robust data collection methods
(Weible et al. 2009, 2011). A particularly novel aspect of this study
is the effort to identify more than two advocacy coalitions within
the national REDD+ policy domain. By identifying coalitions
within coalitions, this study adds nuance to the analysis and helps
avoid any assumptions of “homogeneity in group members either
in beliefs or in coordination patterns” cautioned against by Weible
et al. (2009:130).
METHODS
Identifying policy actors in the national REDD+ policy domain
We began by identifying the policy actors involved in the national
REDD+ policy domain in PNG. Following Knoke et al. (1996),
the main focus of our study was on formal organizations, i.e.,
organizational actors, rather than individual actors. We also drew
on Laumann and Knoke (1987) and Brockhaus and Di Gregorio
(2012) in our definition of REDD+ policy actors as all
organizations perceived by others to be, and that consider
themselves to be, to be a part of the REDD+ policy domain, able
to influence to a greater or lesser degree the agenda setting,
formulation, and implementation of national REDD+ policies.  
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An initial list of organizations that may be part of the national
REDD+ policy domain in PNG was identified based on a review
of relevant literature, including peer-reviewed articles, media
reports, and publicly available documents such as government
and NGO reports, meeting minutes, workshop attendance lists,
and so forth. Through this process an initial list of 40
organizational actors was identified. This list was reviewed by an
expert panel consisting of five individuals representing the
government, the private sector, NGOs, donors, and academia.
They suggested a number of additional organizational actors,
taking the list to 74. Following Saunders (2007), we also applied
the criterion of mutual relevance (Laumann and Knoke 1987)
and if  actors did not consider themselves to be part of the
REDD+ policy domain when contacted to participate in the
study, they were removed from the list. The final list consisted of
66 organizational actors. We grouped actors into seven
organizational categories: government, research institutions,
private sector, national NGOs, international NGOs, other
international organizations, and bilateral or multilateral aid
donors (see Appendix 1 for details about policy actors by actor
group).
Data collection and analytical methods
We used three methods to collect data on an organization’s policy
core beliefs relating to REDD+: (1) social organization survey,
(2) semistructured interviews, and (3) document review.  
A high-level representative of each of the 66 organizations
identified as part of the national REDD+ policy domain was
contacted to participate in a face-to-face survey and
semistructured interview as part of the research. Of the 66
organizations identified as REDD+ policy actors, 45
representatives completed the survey for a response rate of 68%.
Government and private sector actors were under-represented in
the survey data compared with other actor groups, with a response
rate of 58% and 42%, respectively, which was mainly because of
lack of response despite repeated attempts to contact the
organization rather than outright refusal to participate in the
research. Several factors were likely to have influenced the survey
response rate. First, survey data were collected from November
2011 to June 2012, which coincided with a period of political
turmoil in PNG. During this time, there was considerable
ambiguity regarding government leadership positions, and some
organizational actors, particularly state actors, were essentially
on hiatus until scheduled general elections took place in July 2012
and were unable to be contacted. Second, REDD+ is regarded as
a sensitive issue and some actors may have been reluctant to share
what was considered confidential information.  
Semistructured interviews were conducted with representatives
of 28 organizational actors from October 2011 to March 2012.
Time constraints meant that not all organizational actors were
asked to participate in an interview because priority was given to
the survey. However, interviews were conducted with key actors
across all actor groups. 
To triangulate the survey and interview data and address the
limitation of survey nonresponses, information on REDD+
policy core beliefs was also obtained from publicly available
material. Document review included a systematic analysis of
national print media articles published between 2005 and 2010,
content analysis of an organization’s website or published reports
including speeches, and policy positions of formal coalitions or
representative bodies. 
To identify REDD+ policy core beliefs, we drew on the typology
of belief  systems outlined in Sabatier (1998). This typology
provides 10 illustrative components of policy core beliefs,
including 2 “fundamental normative beliefs”: (1) orientation on
basic value priorities and (2) identification of groups/entities
whose welfare is of concern; and eight “empirical components”:
(3) the overall seriousness of the problem, (4) basic causes of the
problem, (5) proper distribution of authority between
government and the market, (6) proper distribution of authority
among levels of government, (7) priority accorded various policy
instruments, (8) method of financing, (9) ability of society to solve
the problem, and (10) participation of public versus experts versus
elected officials (Sabatier 1998:12-13).  
Drawing on the typology of policy beliefs outlined above, and
our interview and survey data, we used an iterative inductive-
deductive process to identify six REDD+ policy core beliefs that
could be used to allocate organizational actors into advocacy
coalitions based on shared beliefs: (1) importance of tackling
drivers of deforestation and degradation, (2) need for structural
and/or governance reforms, (3) promoting the rights of and
benefits for forest-dependent peoples/customary landowners, (4)
promoting evidence-based policy, (5) the need for multiactor and
multilevel, including decentralized, governance, and (6) use of
market-based mechanisms. Using these six precepts, we identified
four initial advocacy coalitions within the national REDD+
policy domain that we named Status Quo, Carbon Entrepreneurs,
Sustainable Livelihoods, and Sustainable Development (Table 1).
Actors were assigned to a particular advocacy coalition if  their
policy core beliefs were consistent with all or a majority of the
precepts defining that coalition.  
For this study, we used qualitative data such as meeting minutes,
group membership, and participant observation to assess whether
the advocacy coalitions we identified based on shared beliefs also
engaged in coordinated activities. We also drew on our qualitative
data to provide information on the main REDD+ policy demands
of each advocacy coalition, as well as policy resources (Weible
2006, Sabatier and Weible 2007) held by members and made
available to advocacy coalitions, such as financial resources,
information, formal authority to make policy decisions, public
opinion, and so forth.  
We then calculated the perceived influence, or reputational power
(Kriesi et al. 2006), of each organizational actor. Organizations
participating in the survey were provided with a list of all 66
organizational actors within the national REDD+ policy domain
with the following instruction: “Please indicate those
organizations that stand out as especially influential on domestic
REDD+ policies.” The reputational power of any given
organization was based on the percentage of survey respondents
that identified that organization as being especially influential.
Following Kriesi and Jegen (2001), we calculated the reputational
power of each advocacy coalition based on the average perceived
influence of all coalition members. We conducted a difference of
means (t) test, using 10,000 permutations of our influence data,
to test the difference between the influence levels of the coalitions.
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Table 1. Criteria used to assign actors to coalitions.
 
Advocacy
coalition
Actively
promoting
tackling drivers
of deforestation
and degradation
Actively
promoting
structural and/or
governance
reforms
Actively promoting
rights of and benefits
for forest-dependent
peoples/customary
landowners
Actively
promoting
evidence-
based policy
Actively
promoting
multiactor,
multilevel
(including
decentralized)
governance
Actively
promoting
market-based
mechanisms
Status Quo No No No N/A No N/A
Carbon
Entrepreneurs
No No Some N/A Some Yes
Sustainable
Livelihoods
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Sustainable
Development
Yes Yes Some Yes Some Some
This statistical test was conducted using R 3.0 (R Core Team
2013), and data were visualized using ggplot2 (Wickham 2009),
also in R 3.0.
RESULTS
Advocacy coalitions for transformational change
We found evidence of two advocacy coalitions promoting
transformational change in the REDD+ policy domain in PNG,
which we labeled the Sustainable Livelihoods and the Sustainable
Development coalitions (Table 2). Among members of the
Sustainable Development coalition, beliefs and interests with
regard to REDD+ are highly diverse. Members understand
REDD+ as a vehicle to support Sustainable Development, low
carbon growth/green growth, biodiversity conservation, and
evidence-based policy. They advocate governance reforms for
pragmatic rather than ideological reasons, for example, bringing
PNG into line with international standards for accessing
international funding, markets, and/or certification schemes. It is
the most diverse advocacy coalition in the REDD+ policy
domain, with members including state actors, international
NGOs, research institutions, bilateral and multilateral donors,
private-sector actors, and an international organization. Despite
this organizational diversity, the coalition is dominated
numerically by international actors, particularly bilateral donors
and NGOs, and both domestic and international research
institutions, which bring financial resources and information to
the coalition (Table 2). It also includes two state actors, the OCCD
and the Department of Environment and Conservation, which
have formal decision-making authority.  
The Sustainable Livelihoods coalition consists of international
and domestic NGOs and one private-sector actor involved in
REDD+ as part of its Corporate Social Responsibility initiative.
Primarily concerned with the rights of customary landowners,
this coalition promotes rights and community-based approaches
to REDD+, advocating for social and environmental safeguards,
multistakeholder governance, information and awareness raising
for customary landowners, and equitable benefit-sharing
arrangements. The coalition’s position on the rights of customary
landowners is particularly salient among the public, thus earning
it resources in terms of public opinion and potential supporters
that can be mobilized. Many of the domestic NGOs also have
links with international networks, which bring information and
financial resources to the coalition. 
Together, the Sustainable Livelihoods and Sustainable
Development advocacy coalitions promote many aspects of
transformational change. However, the two coalitions do hold
different policy core beliefs. For example, they differ in their beliefs
regarding “groups or other entities whose welfare is of greatest
concern” (Sabatier 1998:112). The Sustainable Livelihoods
coalition is mainly concerned with how REDD+ will affect the
welfare and rights of customary landowners, whereas the
Sustainable Development coalition focuses broadly on the
national interest. However, they share many secondary beliefs
around improved forest governance.
Advocacy coalitions supporting business as usual
We also identified two business-as-usual advocacy coalitions,
which we labeled Status Quo and Carbon Entrepreneurs. Neither
coalition actively promotes transformational change in forest
governance that would be needed to achieve REDD+ outcomes. 
The Status Quo advocacy coalition consists of organizations
seeking to maintain or extend their existing control over or access
to forest resources, rather than aiming to reduce deforestation and
forest degradation. This coalition consists of government and
private-sector actors. Organizations in this coalition, e.g., logging
companies, may be directly involved in activities leading to
deforestation or forest degradation; others may indirectly support
forest loss by promoting narrow sectoral interests such as
agricultural expansion or by delegating policy implementation to
others without adequate resources or capacity, and they may have
conflicts of interest that reduce their ability to make decisions
independently of the main actors driving deforestation and forest
degradation. Organizations in this coalition may be directly
involved in activities leading to deforestation or forest
degradation; they may indirectly support forest loss by promoting
narrow sectoral interests such as agricultural expansion; they may
delegate policy implementation to others without adequate
resources or capacity; or they may have conflicts of interest that
reduce their ability to make decisions independently of the main
actors driving deforestation and forest degradation. More than
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Table 2. Advocacy coalitions in the REDD+ policy domain in Papua New Guinea.
 
Advocacy
coalitions
(promoting
transformational
change [TC] or
business as usual
[BAU])
Influence score
(percentage of
policy actors
that nominated
this coalition)
REDD+ policy preferences Coalition resources
(adapted from Weible
[2006] and Sabatier
and Weible [2007])
Coalition members
(number of organizations out of
actor group; percentage of actor
group)
Sustainable
development
(TC)
14.33 (32%) •That REDD+ covers opportunity
costs of forest conservation
•Economic diversification/“green
growth”
•Governance and institutional
reform
•Evidence-based/good public policy
•Formal legal
authority to make
policy decisions
•Information
•Financial resources
•Donors (n=10; 100%)
•Research institutions (n=8;
100%)
•Domestic NGOs (n=5; 50%)
•Int. NGOs (n=5; 50%)
•Government (n=3; 25%)
•Private sector (n=3; 25%)
•Int. organizations (n=1; 50%)
Sustainable
livelihoods
(TC)
14.00 (31%) •Social and environmental
safeguards
•Multistakeholder governance
•Information and awareness raising
for resource owners
•Equitable benefit-sharing
arrangements
•Community-based REDD+
•Public opinion
•Information
•Supporters that can
be mobilized
•Domestic NGOs (n=9; 75%)
•International NGOs (n=5; 50%)
•Private sector (n=1; 8%)
Status quo
(BAU)
20.42 (45%) •No halt to commercial logging
•Reduced impact logging/secondary
forest management as part of
REDD+
•No voluntary carbon projects
•Central government coordination/
control
•Minimal conditions on
international funds
•Formal legal
authority to make
policy decisions
•Information
•Financial resources
•Government (n=8; 67%)
•Private sector (n=4; 33%)
Carbon
entrepreneurs
(BAU)
12.33 (27%) •Policy to support voluntary carbon
projects
•Little central government control/
oversight (projects negotiated
directly
with resource owners)
•No focus on governance reforms or
building enabling environment
•Information
•Financial resources
•Private sector (n=4; 33%)
•International organizations
(n=1; 50%)
•Government (n=1; 8%)
two-thirds of all government actors in the REDD+ policy domain
are in this coalition, and several members of this coalition have
legal authority to make policy decisions. One such member is the
Papua New Guinea Forest Authority, which despite developing
a forest and climate change policy incorporating REDD+, still
promotes business-as-usual industrial-scale logging for export.
Private-sector actors in this advocacy coalition include the PNG
Forest Industry Association and the largest logging company in
the country, Rimbunan Hijau, which contribute financial
resources and information to the coalition. 
Members of the Carbon Entrepreneurs advocacy coalition largely
seek personal gain through carbon trading, e.g., financial,
reputational, early-adopter advantage, and so forth, with little
interest in securing long-term carbon emission reductions.
Members of this coalition promote the use of market-based
instruments for REDD+, particularly voluntary carbon markets,
and include so-called carbon cowboys as well as more legitimate
organizations promoting market-based mechanisms for
REDD+. It is important to note that not all actors that support
market-based mechanisms fall into the Carbon Entrepreneurs
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advocacy coalition. This coalition is characterized by its focus on
short-term individual gain rather than on governance reforms
capable of securing permanent REDD+ outcomes for broader
societal welfare. No member of this coalition has formal decision-
making authority. 
Although both these advocacy coalitions support aspects of
business as usual, they differ in their policy core beliefs, such as
the appropriate distribution of authority between government
and the market (Sabatier 1998). For example, some members of
the Status Quo coalition support REDD+ as part of an
international compliance market under the UNFCCC and do not
support the development of forest carbon projects in PNG for
the voluntary market (Somare 2009, Gridneff  2010). By contrast,
most members of the Carbon Entrepreneurs coalition support
voluntary carbon markets and are critical of central government
control over REDD+ (Talu 2009).
Reputational power of advocacy coalitions in the REDD+ policy
domain
We calculated the reputational power of each advocacy coalition
to consider the potential for the coalitions to translate their beliefs
and interests into formal policy. The Status Quo coalition has the
highest reputational power within the national REDD+ policy
domain, with coalition members on average deemed especially
influential by 45% of survey respondents. The Sustainable
Development and Sustainable Livelihoods advocacy coalitions
have similar levels of power, with mean influence scores of 32%
and 31%, respectively. The Carbon Entrepreneurs coalition has
the lowest reputational power, perceived as especially influential
by 27% of survey respondents (Table 1). 
A comparison of the mean perceived influence scores of the two
most influential advocacy coalitions, Status Quo and Sustainable
Development, shows that the Status Quo coalition had a
significantly higher mean influence score than the Sustainable
Development coalition (t = 1.9273; P value based on 10,000
permutations of the groups = 0.025), suggesting its reputational
power is significantly greater than that of the other advocacy
coalitions present in the national REDD+ policy domain. In turn,
this suggests that the Status Quo coalition holds greater power to
have its interests and beliefs reflected in formal policy. 
Mean perceived influence is just one measure of a coalition’s
power, however. It is important to consider that the Sustainable
Development coalition is numerically dominant and counts
among its members the organization considered most influential,
the OCCD, which is responsible for REDD+ policy development
and coordination and is perceived as being especially influential
by 87% of respondents (Fig. 1). The Sustainable Livelihoods
coalition counts among its members the second most influential
organization, the Eco-Forestry Forum, which is perceived as being
especially influential by 80% of respondents. Coalitions for
transformational change, in other words, are both numerically
dominant and contain two of the three most influential
organizations.
DISCUSSION
Our analysis of the national REDD+ policy domain identified
two distinct advocacy coalitions promoting transformational
change in forest governance in PNG: Sustainable Development
and Sustainable Livelihoods. However, our reputational power
Fig. 1. Perceived influence of REDD+ advocacy coalitions in
Papua New Guinea.
analysis suggests they are currently minority advocacy coalitions
and are not sufficiently powerful to challenge business-as-usual
interests responsible for deforestation and forest degradation in
PNG. 
Status Quo, the dominant advocacy coalition in the REDD+
policy domain, promotes many aspects of business as usual and
wields the most influence over the national REDD+ policy
domain. We suggest that the potential for transformational
change in PNG is currently constrained by this advocacy
coalition. In particular, private-sector actors within this advocacy
coalition wield considerable political influence and are seen as a
key barrier to transformational change, with one interviewee
stating of the largest logging company in the country, Rimbunan
Hijau: “they run forestry in this country, they run the local biggest
newspaper, they are one of the biggest employers in the country,
they have enormous political power.” (Interview with an NGO
representative, 10 February 2012) 
By contrast, we found that members of the Carbon Entrepreneurs
advocacy coalition, which also promote elements of business as
usual, have the least influence over national REDD+ policies.
Even though some members of this coalition were highly visible
within the public debate on REDD+, they struggled to
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institutionalize their interests in national REDD+ policy
processes. Indeed, many of its members have largely disappeared
as organizational actors from the national REDD+ policy
domain. This is significant, because some of these organizations
appeared to wield considerable influence over initial national
REDD+ policy processes in PNG between 2008 and 2010 (Babon
2011), including the policy monopoly exerted by Somare and
Conrad. 
It now appears that the early REDD+ policy entrepreneurs have
little continuing influence over national REDD+ policies, and the
policy monopoly once exerted by a small group of policy elites
has been replaced by more open, transparent, and participatory
decision making. Indeed, many interviewees across actor groups
acknowledged that the OCCD had become more open and
consultative over time, and commended the functioning of
OCCD’s Technical Working Groups. Interviews suggest a number
of reasons for the shift toward greater stakeholder participation
in REDD+ policy processes: public pressure from NGOs and
donors, the change in government leadership in late 2011 and
resulting breakup of the policy monopoly that had previously
dominated the government’s climate change activities, the
departure of McKinsey & Company as strategic advisors to the
government on climate change and REDD+, and awareness of
the damage done to PNG’s international reputation by the poor
governance of REDD+ under the early incarnations of the Office
of Climate Change. These developments can be interpreted as a
further indication of what our analysis suggests: despite the
current dominance of business-as-usual interests in the national
REDD+ policy domain, some potential pathways to
transformational change may be open in PNG. 
First, the Sustainable Development advocacy coalition has been
somewhat successful in translating its policy preferences into
formal policy, both within and outside the forest policy domain.
For example, one of the seven pillars of PNG’s long-term national
strategy released in 2010 is Environmental Sustainability and
Climate Change and includes a number of goals related to
REDD+ (National Strategic Plan Taskforce 2010). However,
there is still considerable policy inconsistency to resolve, with one
interviewee suggesting:  
 The country currently has an ambiguous position. On
the one hand, very large scale logging operations are
happening; on the other hand, the country being very
willing to receive some REDD+ funding and to put in
place a REDD+ system. So I think they will eventually
have to come to sorting out these two extreme points.
(Interview with a donor representative, 14 February 2012)  
Another potential pathway to transformational change is through
the building of “coalitions of convenience” that can bring
additional resources to minority coalitions. There is already
evidence of an unlikely alliance between the oil palm industry and
civil society organizations, which were previously at odds over the
social and environmental impacts of oil palm development in
PNG. They have formed a coalition of convenience to oppose the
allocation of Special Agriculture and Business Leases, which are
granted ostensibly for agricultural development, but are widely
believed to be misused as a vehicle for timber extraction by a
“virtual” oil palm industry (Filer 2012, Greenpeace 2012). Newly
emerging coalitions of convenience with incoming allies that
bring additional resources or can negotiate agreements over
common problems provide two additional pathways to
transformational change. The moratorium and Commission of
Inquiry into Special Agriculture and Business Leases announced
by the government of PNG in July 2011 may be an example of a
negotiated agreement between coalitions on both sides to tackle
this particular driver of deforestation. 
The final potential pathway to transformational change comes
through policy-oriented learning that can lead to changes in
policy core beliefs within the dominant advocacy coalition. For
example, the Papua New Guinea Forest Authority, a key member
of the Status Quo advocacy coalition, has developed a climate
change policy and established a REDD+ and Climate Change
Branch, and is leading the establishment of REDD+ pilot
projects. Policy learning arising from these sorts of activities and
exposure to new ideas and incentives have the potential to reorient
the Papua New Guinea Forest Authority so that it comes to
support a wider range of options for forest use and management,
rather than maintaining its current dominant focus on managing
forests for commercial logging. However, like Sabatier (1998), we
believe that realizing these potential pathways will require skillful
leadership to exploit opportunities and build cohesive and
powerful coalitions that can challenge dominant business-as-
usual interests and achieve policy change.
CONCLUSION
PNG’s early interest in and active promotion of REDD+ at the
international level have been followed by only modest changes in
national policy and practice. Our findings clearly suggest that,
despite the early presence of high-profile REDD+ policy
entrepreneurs and the government’s pro-REDD+ position at the
international level, the most powerful coalition of actors in the
domestic policy sphere continues to defend existing institutional
structures that support business as usual, particularly
unsustainable rates of commercial timber harvesting and large-
scale forest clearance under the guise of agricultural
development.  
We found that the two advocacy coalitions calling for
transformational change remain minority coalitions. Although
the emergence of REDD+ as an idea has strengthened the
resources of these two coalitions through the development of
coalitions of convenience and the provision of additional
resources, their influence remains insufficient to effectively
challenge the dominance of the business-as-usual coalition.
However, we suggest there is some cause for optimism given
several characteristics of the REDD+ policy domain that have
the potential to challenge existing power relations, including (1)
the growing power of transformational change coalitions, in part
through the rising salience and relevance of their beliefs as well
as through enlisting powerful new members; (2) the merging of
coalitions based on emerging shared beliefs and objectives, e.g.,
green growth; and (3) policy-oriented learning and resulting
changes in policy preferences of individual business-as-usual
actors.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/6486
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Appendix 1. Number of policy actors (organizations) in each actor group and their participation in the survey and interview.
Actor group No. of actors No. of survey
respondents
Survey response
rate (%)
No. of interview
participants
Interview
coverage (%)
Government 12 7 58% 5 42%
University/Research institutes 8 6 75% 4 50%
Private sector 12 5 42% 3 25%
National NGOs 12 10 83% 7 58%
International NGOs 10 9 90% 4 40%
International organizations 2 1 50% 0 0%
Donor 10 7 70% 5 50%
Total 66 45 68% 28 42%
